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RESPONSES TO WORLD WAR TWO CRIMINALS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS: NATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
EUROPEAN RESPONSES

ProfessorGeorge Fletcher: Good Morning. I'm George Fletcher, ' the moderator of the first
panel. We're going to discuss European legal responses to the Holocaust. Our time is
very brief and therefore, I propose that we proceed in the following way. Our two
speakers, Professor Henry Friedlander 2 and Mr. Fritz Weinschenk, represent sophisticated and diverse perspectives on the general problem of justice in the European trials.
Professor Friedlander will give us a general overview and his perspective on the problem.
Mr. Weinschenk will then tell us about some practical aspects on the basis of his detailed
experience. I will delegate to myself the privilege of asking a few questions at the outset
and then we will turn the floor over to general discussion. First, Professor Friedlander
please.
ProfessorHenry Friedlander:Immediately after the war, the Nuremberg and other Allied
trials preempted the prosecution of Nazi crimes in postwar Germany. German and
Austrian courts, 4 the subject of my talk this morning, which were opened in late 1945,
could only prosecute Nazi crimes committed against German (and Austrian) nationals
(or stateless persons), and not against Allied nationals, including Jews from Allied countries. Not until 1950 did they gain jurisdiction over such crimes. What is interesting
about the trials in the German and Austrian courts is the fact that they applied the
traditional Penal Code of Germany and Austria. Thus, for example, Germany applied
two types of law: first, the Penal Code of 1871 and the Criminal Procedures of 1877,
and second, the Military Penal Code of 1877, which applied both to German soldiers
and to ,the SS and police. In Germany, however, the courts could also apply Allied
Control Council Law No. 10, which was the basic law under which the Allied courts at
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Nuremberg and elsewhere operated, and which included "Crimes Against Humanity."
The situation was similar in Austria, where special laws included the crime of "treason
against the Austrian state."
Of special interest, Control Council Law No. 10 permitted the German courts to
prosecute a group of Nazi criminals that could not be touched under their own National
Penal Code. These were the so-called informers. There is nothing in the normal criminal
law, I would suppose, though I am not an attorney, that makes it illegal for a person to
report a true statement to the local police. In other words, a German could go to the
police, be it the Gestapo, the regular uniformed police, or the judicial authorities and
report that his or her neighbor was listening to a foreign news broadcast, was hiding
Jews, or was cursing Hitler, or doing something else prohibited by the law at that time.
If the fact was true, that is, the neighbor was listening to foreign broadcasts, hidingJews,
or cursing Hitler, then there was nothing in the Penal Code that made this report
punishable. In fact, a good citizen is supposed to report to the police crimes that take
place in his or her neighborhood. Only under Control Council Law No. 10, with its
"Crime Against Humanity" provision, which included in its definition "persecution on
political, racial or religious grounds," could the German courts sentence these informers.
This is one example of the limitations of the National Penal Code and the advantages
of applying new law.
In the immediate postwar years, both Control Council Law No. 10 and the National
Penal Codes were applied with great severity. Death sentences were handed down in
both Germany and Austria. Some of them were also carried out before the abolition of
the death penalty (in West Germany in 1949 and later in Austria and West Berlin).
Heavy sentences were also handed down. The number of prosecutions was extremely
high in those years. An overwhelming majority of all prosecutions of war criminals that
have been carried out in Germany and Austria were carried out in those immediate
postwar years. Most of them, however, involved minor felonies. One example is the trials
of those who participated in the November 1938 pogrom known as Kristallnacht,which
included the burning of synagogues and the demolition of Jewish shops. Those persons
were sentenced in large numbers in the immediate postwar years. They were prosecuted
for "breach of the peace," in German, Landfriedensbruch, which was an old Prussian law
that applied to those participating with a mob in causing physical damage to buildings,
etc. It carried a sentence from about six months to about five years.
This high prosecution rate changed in the 1950's, when Germany, both West and
East, and Austria, received their independence from the Allies. They could then prosecute all crimes, including those committed in the territories formerly occupied by
Germany. However, limitations were imposed upon them by the Allies. First, the Western
Allies refused to permit the Germans to use Control Council Law No. 10, which had to
be terminated. Allied law could no longer be applied. Second, the so-called transfer
agreement between the Allies and West Germany of 1952, ratified by the Senate of the
United States in 1955, stipulated in paragraph 1, chapter 1, that "German courts may
exercise such jurisdiction as they have under German Law, unless investigation of the
alleged offense was finally completed by the prosecuting authorities of the power or
powers concerned." What this basically came down to was that major killers, for example,
chiefs of concentration camps or heads of Einsatzkommandos, who at Nuremberg had
been condemned to death, then had their sentences reduced to life in prison, and finally
were let go by 1958, could no longer be tried in German courts. These senior perpetrators
would then appear as witnesses in the trials of their former subordinates. This introduced
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a certain amount of cynicism on many levels. Only France has revised this provision.
The United States and Britain have never revised it, and now it is probably too late to
try these people.
As far as the West German trials are concerned (and this applies also to Austria),
the Bundestag decided not to apply retroactive law. Only the law operating at the time
of the commission of the crime in the 1930's and 1940's could be applied. The genocide
provision, which was incorporated as a new law into the German Penal Code could not
be applied retroactively to Nazi crimes. Therefore, war criminals had to be convicted
for crimes already prescribed in the Penal Code, such as murder and manslaughter.
This has both disadvantages and advantages. The disadvantage is, of course, that this
law was never designed to prosecute war criminals. It was designed for ordinary crimes
and ordinary criminals, as we understand it. It was designed for perpetrators operating
outside the accepted boundaries of society. However, Nazi crimes were sponsored by the
government and the Nazi perpetrators acted on behalf of the nation. The usual needs
of society, prevention and re-socialization, simply did not apply in trials of Nazi criminals.
They -were always very well adjusted and well behaved, prior and after the commission
of the crimes, they were "good neighbors" and all that. They are thus much harder to
judge under the restraints of a traditional penal code.
Not until the late 1950's did prosecutions became prevalent; until then most thought
that all criminals had already been prosecuted. When one compares East Germany to
West Germany, the differences are striking. In the German Democratic Republic, the
judiciary remained purged of former Nazis. In West Germany, however, the so-called
131 Law returned all civil servants to their jobs unless they had been convicted of a
crime. Like West Germany, East Germany applied the traditional German Penal Code
until the late 1960's when the new Socialist Penal Code was introduced. But, unlike the
West Germans, they did apply retroactive law by incorporating the Nuremberg provisions
into the German Penal Code. Nevertheless, there were fewer trials in East Germany.
One explanation offered by East Germans, one I am willing to accept, argues that most
Nazis with something to fear fled to the West. The West was far more attractive to them
for all kinds of reasons. This began immediately at the end of the war, and with the
exception of small groups of local Nazis this is probably quite true.
In Austria there were also fewer trials. One explanation is that Austrians, with Allied
help, had been able to play the role of a country occupied by the Germans. The Allies
had classified Austria, like Czechoslovakia, Poland or France, as one of the victims of
Nazi Germany, and on that basis Austrians were able to say, "Let the Germans do it."
I would like to add only one more comment to this survey: whatever the results of
trials in West Germany, Austria and East Germany, they have been of enormous help to
historians.
Let me sketch two problems that have confronted West German courts and prosecutors. The first is the differentiation between murder and manslaughter, which is
extraordinarily complex, and which is based not on premeditation but on the nature of
the crime. This forces the German prosecutors and the German courts to investigate in
far greater detail the motives of the perpetrators and the circumstances of the deed,
which tell us much about the nature of Nazi criminality. Of course, this may not help
the ends of justice by convicting and sentencing criminals but, because the courts must
analyze the evidence along these lines, it does help us to understand the criminal act.
The second point I would like to make involves the nature of the defense. One

available defense is duress. All Nazis perpetrators have claimed "duress under orders"

BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:3

(Befehlsnotstand). In other words, they have claimed that if they had not carried out these
criminal orders, they or their families would have suffered severe penalties. But in forty
years of judicial proceedings, not one single case has ever been produced to prove this
allegation; no one has ever proved that anyone ever suffered or would have suffered
such penalties had he refused to carry out a criminal order. It is widely believed that no
such penalty was ever imposed, or could be imposed, on a German perpetrator. We also
know the reverse: the careers of those who refused to carry out such orders did not
suffer, some were later even promoted.
However, the courts can and do recognize "putative duress." Thus, if the perpetrator
"believed" that something would happen to him, this can be an acceptable defense. It is
usually granted only to persons of limited education, who therefore did not at that time
comprehend their legal position. By the way, it is therefore also rarely granted to lawyers
in the SS. The courts imposed restrictions before "putative duress" could be granted. In
other words, the perpetrator must prove that he did everything possible to avoid following the criminal orders. It is not enough to go to the superior officer and say, "I would
rather not do it," and then, when the superior replies, "It is an order," carry out the
deed. The perpetrator has to do a little more to show that he tried to avoid following
the criminal orders. Further, he must carry out the order only as far as is necessary to
comply; he may not exceed them.
Another point that the courts must examine is embedded in Article 47 of the German
Military Penal Code. By the way, it was embarrassing for the Allies that the American
and British Military Penal Codes did not include a provision as progressive as Article 47
of the German Military Penal Code, which remained on the books during the Nazi
period, although it was not enforced. Article 47 provided, as did the American and
British codes, that a soldier who carries out his superior's criminal order is not punishable; punishment is imposed only on his superior, who issued the order. However, Article
47 added that the soldier is to be punished if he was aware of the criminal nature of
that order. The American and British Military Penal Codes of World War II did not
include that provision; after the war they added it. That means that the court must
prove that the perpetrator was aware of the criminal nature of his orders. In other
words, the defendant can use as a defense the argument that he did not know what the
law was.
This defense was similar to another defense often used. It arose in a case that had
nothing to do with Nazi crimes. It was a Hamburg case involving an attorney who, in
the middle of a trial, told his client that unless she paid him the bill she owed, he would
no longer defend her. The state attorney charged the attorney with coercion, and he
was convicted in the Hamburg courts. The Supreme Federal Court of Germany overturned the conviction. His act was illegal, but he had in good faith believed that it was
legal. He had thus committed an "error of law" (Verbotsirrtum). The defense of "error in
fact" had long been accepted in German courts; the "error of law" defense was new.
And this defense was thereafter used by Nazi war criminals.
It is interesting to note that one cannot claim both duress and "error of law" as a
defense. This is what happened in the case of two physicians tried in an euthanasia case.
Physician Number One stonewalled, saying, "I was doing the right thing, there was
nothing wrong with what I did, killing these patients." Physician Number Two said, "It's
a terrible crime and I was opposed to it, but I operated under duress. If I hadn't gone
along, they would have done this and that to me." They were both convicted, but when
it went to the appellate court, they remanded it with the demand that possible "error of
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law" be considered. On remand, Physician Number One, who had stonewalled, got off,
because the court could not prove that he really knew that euthanasia was a criminal
act. However, Physician Number Two, who had claimed duress, was again convicted.
The reason was as follows: As the physician committed the criminal act only under
duress, he obviously knew that he was committing a crime. Conversely, if the physician
did not know it was a criminal act, he would not have needed duress to make him
pliable. Because of this decision, perpetrators henceforth found themselves in the position of having to choose at the beginning which defense to offer - duress or ignorance
of the criminal nature of the act.
May I add one thing at the end: what makes the trials in German courts so valuable,
is not the rate of conviction, which is low, and not the size of the sentences, which are
minuscule; it is the historical work done by the prosecutors and the courts. Considering
the denial of the Holocaust today, their work is of extreme importance, because the
documentation compiled in these trials proves that the Holocaust did happen.
ProfessorFletcher: Thank you very much, Professor Friedlander for that excellent presentation. Now I would like to turn the platform over to Mr. Weinschenk who will tell us
about some practical aspects of these trials.
Mr. Fritz Weinschenk: Professor Friedlander has given you something of the law and the
history of these trials. I'm here to give a report today on the nitty-gritty, on how these
trials worked in actuality from the standpoint of a practicing lawyer who has taken part
in them for more than twenty years. How do you deal with hundreds and thousands of
criminal defendants? How do you deal with many thousands of fact patterns? If you
have a jury trial for each defendant you would stretch to the year 2005. It so happens
that the German criminal procedure, which is the continental type and vastly different
from ours, expedited the trials of these perpetrators in a due process manner. In order
to understand this, we have to go into a little bit of the German system of criminal
prosecution.
First of all, a German proceeding starts with a prosecutorial investigation. The
prosecutor by law is required to inquire into all crimes that come to his attention. He
has to do this as our grand jury would. He has to examine the witnesses, the documentary
evidence collected, and the experts. He has to do this in a very thorough manner, much
more thoroughly than our grand jury. Our grand jury has to find evidence sufficient to
make out a prima fade case. He has to go, not only into the primafacie aspects, but he
also has to consider the defense. He has to act as an investigative organ of the state.
When he is finished with his comprehensive examination, he collects all his material and
presents it to the court. This is in the nature of an indictment or complaint.
The complaint is a very voluminous document in Nazi cases. It usually runs into
several hundred pages. It quotes not only who the witnesses are, but what they said and
what their testimony will be. It has photographs, documents, and the entire case. The
court will then consider the complaint and decide whether there is a legally founded
case, i.e., whether the indictment is legally sufficient. If it is not sufficient, they will
dismiss the case. The curious factor is that the prosecutor can appeal from the decision
of the court not to consider the complaint. If the court finds the indictment sufficient,
they will open the trial. The defendant does not have a right to appeal from the decision
of the court to open the trial.
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The jurisdiction in Nazi cases lies with the court of general jurisdiction, which has
two parts, a civil part and a criminal or penal part. The penal part has jurisdiction over
the crimes of homicide, murder, and manslaughter, which are usually the complaints in
Nazi cases. The cases are tried before a panel of three judges and two jurors. The system
is different from ours. There are no rules of evidence. The court can freely consider all
evidence and sua sponte rule out evidence it considers irrelevant. The two jurors are, as
the comparatists in this audience will know better than I, there to infuse common sense
and life experience into the deliberations of the judges. They have a full voice in the
deliberations of the court.
I have had some weird experiences with German jurors. In one case a witness was
testifying about an action in a ghetto by German troops. He testified that they had their
rifles shoulder-carried and I overheard this juror saying, "That witness must be lying.
We always carried our rifles muazle downward in the rain."
After the evidence has been heard by the court in a series of hearings, not in a trial
as we know it in the United States, but in a continuous series of hearings which may not
be interrupted by more than ten days, they will make a judgment. Many witnesses in
Holocaust cases refuse to step on German soil. In cases of that kind the entire court,
minus the defendants, will go to the witnesses. Thus, German courts have been in Israel
for months, as well as in the United States, Poland, the Soviet Union, and even Australia.
You can imagine the amount of money and time that has to be spent on this. If the
court meets in foreign countries, sometimes permission has to be obtained from the
judicial authorities of the country where they meet in order not to violate sovereignty
of that state. The testimony also has to be heard by locally authorized judicial officers
or attorneys who have subpoena power, in order to make the testimony valid in the
court back home. After the evidence is heard, which usually takes years, the judgment
is rendered. The judgment, as Professor Friedlander mentioned, in one case could be
several volumes, encompassing thousands of pages. The judgment is a verdict, a summation, a probation report, and a sentencing all rolled into one. It is utterly unlike what
we are used to in this country. After the judgment, the case can be appealed. Either
party can easily appeal on an issue of fact or law. The entire case will then be heard
again. Most of the testimony of the witnesses, however, will not have to be repeated.
After the first appeal, a second appeal on issues of law can be made to the German
Supreme Court. You can easily see what kind of time and effort this takes.
Professor Friedlander has mentioned the meager results of prosecutions. These
results are indeed very depressing. I have data on the trials from May 8, 1945 to January
1, 1986. Prior to 1949 there were 12 death sentences, and from 1945 to date there were
160 life sentences, 6,192 prison terms less than life, and 83,153 not guilty, incompetence,
and lack of proof dismissals. There are 1,302 cases still pending at this time. These are
depressing statistics at first blush. The German judicial official in charge, the chief
prosecutor in Ludwigsburg, insists, and I think rightfully so, that this is not because of
a lack of will or a lack of effort to prosecute. I have to say, and I think Professor
Friedlander will agree with me, that this program has been a massive national effort to
seek justice. I don't think that is deniable. However, the inability to achieve due process
convictions in this area stems from the difficulty and sometimes impossibility of making
proof. I can make this clearer by describing to you the type of evidence that is needed.
The first type of evidence is documentary. Documents speak for themselves, and
they are very important. But documents are only circumstantial. Until about the middle
of the 1960's, the Germans were limited to the documentation that was then available.
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There were large volumes, massive quantities of documents that had been in East
Germany, that were still in the United States at that time in Alexandria, Virginia, and
in Israel in the Yad Vashem and other places. Only in the middle of the 1960's were the
Germans able to evaluate and get a hold of the massive documentation that was in
Poland, in the Soviet Union, in Israel and so on.
You cannot convict on documents alone. The other type of evidence that you need,
as Professor Friedlander pointed out, is witnesses. You have two classes of witnesses.
You have colleagues and comrades of the perpetrators, and you have victims. The
colleagues of the perpetrators are reticent. First of all, they have sympathies with the
defendants. Second, they have a certain fear of incriminating themselves. The victims,
of course, as witnesses, while we deeply sympathize with them and are affected by their
stories, can be broken down by any half-way competent defense counsel in two minutes
flat. You cannot, after twenty years, testify validly about a murder case. You have trials
in the United States where witnesses are judged as unreliable after one year. So that is
a problem. The result of this is that the trials have become longer and longer. Where in
1962, from the start of the prosecutorial investigation, it took 3.6 years, in 1977, a case
from the start of the prosecutorial investigation to the end of the first stage, the trial
stage, took 16.8 years. This is not the fault of the German courts, it is simply the result
of the circumstances in those trials.
In conclusion, you ask, what is the result? I agree very much with Professor Friedlander, that there has been a unique historical effort and a unique result. However, the
task is tremendously difficult, and requires a massive national effort to carry out a due
process program of Holocaust trial in any country, by a successor regime that supercedes
a criminal regime like the Nazis'. Thank you very much.
ProfessorFletcher: Thank you very much Mr. Weinschenk for that excellent presentation.
I'd like to make a few quick comments myself and then we'll open the floor to questions.
First, I think it's important to note one important difference between German procedures
and our own. It's a difference that complicates these trials. There is no principle, no
possibility of granting immunity to co-conspirators as a way of securing testimony at a
trial. There is no institution of state's witness or some technique that would enable one
to get some conspirators or some other people who were involved to testify against each
other. That is precluded by the principle of the legality of full prosecution.
Second, I'd like to raise a few points about the issue of retroactivity. I think that's
one of the hottest civil liberties issues in all of these trials. A major legal development in
Germany that requires mention is the long struggle to abolish the statute of limitations
in these cases. The statute of limitations in the Code, at the time that the crimes were
committed, was twenty years. That meant that if the statute started running in 1944, it
should have been due in 1965. Then in 1969, they extended the statute of limitations
for ten years. Finally, in 1979, as you probably know, after a long and deep debate in
German society, in the newspapers as well as in the legal community, they abolished the
statute of limitations altogether. I don't have that much sympathy as a personal matter
for those who would want to say that war criminals have a right to rely upon a statute
of limitations. But it is not a simple issue. That is, one has to recognize that there is
some argument on the other side. There is a problem of procedural due process in
repealing the statute of limitations.
A further problem of retroactivity concerns the recognition of claims of superior
orders and justification generally. Now I have seen some cases involving Kristallnacht,the
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"night of broken glass," of prosecutions for the malicious destruction of property, in
which the defendants relied upon some notion of administrative regulation or superior
orders for participating in the mob violence. There is no doubt that the participants
thought that what they were doing was fully legitimate. The position of the German
courts in this question is that the term "wrongfulness" or "unlawfulness" has to be
interpreted normatively. That is, it is not a defense simply to rely upon an actual order
or an actual regulation if that order or regulation violates higher principles of law.
However, it cannot be denied that the rejection of these defenses of superior orders
constitutes an element of retroactive prosecution. That is, one is prosecuting people on
the basis of law that existed at the time they committed the offenses, namely on the basis
of the criminal code. But the prosecutor is not recognizing the institutionalized set of
orders on which people relied when they engaged in mob violence. In so doing, one is
disregarding a part of the law that benefits the defendant.
Consequently, the "mistake of law" defense is necessary, because it operates partly
as a corrective measure against the rejection of the claim of superior orders or justification based upon other regulation. It should be pointed out, though, that the defense
does not require that the defendant know that he was engaged in wrongdoing. It only
requires that he should have known. There were arguments in the early stages of this
game in which they argued that knowledge of actual wrongdoing was necessary, but
from that 1952 decision the Supreme Court rejected the requirement of actual knowledge.
ProfessorFriedlander:May I say something? Obviously I am not as knowledgeable about
this historical setting and history of law. The debate over the statute of limitations has
always focused only on murder, not on manslaughter, which is quite different from the
United States and, therefore, most everything had already expired before the debates
began. They have argued that it is not retroactive because it involves procedure rather
than substantive law, and procedure can always be changed. Obviously, there could be
two opinions on this matter.
Your idea of linking a mistake of law defense with this refusal to accept superior
orders is an intriguing thought. But, as a historian, causation is a very serious matter.
The case that I described, which showed how a mistake of law defense was first accepted
by the German courts, was based on something that had nothing to do with Nazi crimes.
Now when it comes to superior orders, the German courts have from the very
beginning taken a very logical position, it seems to me. For example, Hitler wrote an
authorization for the euthanasia program on his private stationery, which not many saw.
It was locked away and shown to certain select people. Now that is not the way law, even
in Nazi Germany, was passed. The German courts ruled that before the law could be
binding it had to be proposed by a ministry and discussed with various Nazi ministers.
Hitler would then make a decision, and the law would be published in the gazette. But
these laws were never published. The German courts held that you cannot set up a
totalitarian regime and simply decide what law is. This was done in Nazi Germany when
Himmler wrote a letter to the newspapers. This letter was considered law, and was
enforced by his various agencies. But that, courts very early decided, is not law. Otherwise, everything was permissible.
ProfessorFletcher: I think your argument is very intriguing. You're using a positivistic
model to attack the legal status of these Nazi regulations, but there is no doubt in the
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opinions of the German courts that their basis for rejecting the defenses is not technical
or formal, but simply because these defenses flatly violated principles of natural justice.
That is, these orders were on the basis of their substance, invalid, not on the basis of
their form.
ProfessorFriedlander: Some courts did, in the early years, argue that way. I never saw it
fully accepted by all of them as the basis.
Professor Fletcher: It is easier for a court to make this kind of technical argument. But
they felt that their moral position was stronger and they had no qualms about taking a
higher road in rcjecting Nazi legislation that could be used as a basis for defense.
Mr. Weinschenk: I just wanted to say that to me this question is basic. It goes much deeper
than the Nazis. It goes into the responsibility of say, presidents of corporations and
political leaders. It is a basic question. The way the Germans have handled it, the German
Supreme Court has handled it, on the whole, is commendable.
The treatment goes into philosophy. It goes into the natural law concept. It goes
beyond what to me is, after all, a legal technicality. It goes to what the Eichmann Court
in Jerusalem called the "Black Heart Theory." In other words, when you commit these
things there is a law, there is a line where you deviate from acceptable moral norms
regardless of what statute is in force. I think that the German Supreme Court has laid
down the rules there very plainly. I don't know whether Professor Friedlander agrees.
ProfessorFriedlander:You have to do two things at a trial in Germany. First the court has
to decide: was this act an act of murder? And on that level you are absolutely right, they
decide that it was an act of murder on this basis of positive greater law. But when it
comes down to fixing the guilt of the actual defendant, whether defense can be offered,
then they are technical, then they are legalistic. If the legalistic rule doesn't exist, then
he gets off. It was an act of murder, but he had an excuse and in most of the cases I
have looked at, this has worked.
Professor Fletcher: I would not agree with that. I take it that the euthanasia cases you're
referring to are those that were published in 1946 or 1947.
ProfessorFriedlander: No. They go as late as the 1950's as well.
ProfessorFletcher: The defense that was recognized in the euthanasia case was a totally
novel defense. The first set of courts that handled these under the allied occupation
held that the doctors who participated in the mercy killing of mentally imbalanced,
defective patients were culpable. They acted wrongfully despite the unpublished order.
They were personally to blame for having done it. But nonetheless, they could make
out a good defense and avoid liability for participating in these homicide cases. In the
first set of cases that was published the doctor's argument was that if they had not
participated in the euthanasia, other doctors would have done it more zealously. This is
a kind of utilitarian argument which the court explicitly rejected. Nonetheless, a totally
novel claim developed; that because the doctors had lived in some kind of hermetic
world, insulated from normal moral sensibilities, they should not be punished for what
they had done. That displayed considerable ingenuity on the part of the court, going
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beyond any kind of written legal materials. I think in fairness to the audience we should
open up to a few questions.
Question: I wanted to understand the low conviction rate a little more. What is the
standard of proof that is required? Who was the decision-maker as between the judge
and the jury? You mentioned that the judges were those who sometimes served under
the Nazi regime. Is that a factor in the low conviction rate? Who were the juries? There
were so many cases. Were the same people used for many cases? How were they selected?
Were people excluded for war time or Nazi participation? How did the conviction rate
in West Germany compare to East Germany? Was it higher?
Mr. Weinschenk: I have seen a lot of courts. Many, many of the judges were young. They
were not even teenagers during World War II. I have seen few judges that were even
German soldiers during World War II. There are some of course.
Question: But my question was directed specifically to the postwar, pre-1950, when 85%
of the cases were tried.
Mr. Weinschenk: It is the other way around. I think that most cases were tried after that.
There are relatively few instances known to me where there were judges with a Nazi
background. People who were heavily incriminated were barred from judicial office
unofficially. The jurors are selected from voting lists and different jurors have to sit on
different cases. They are from all levels of the population. The jurors that I have seen
have only a limited voice in the deliberations of the court. There are only two jurors
and they can be out-voted by the three judges. They are not the triers of the fact really,
as in our system. They only act. Now as to the second part of your question. I am of the
opinion that the trials in East Germany lacked due process. I do not agree that we can
regard the East German trials as adequate to our standards. I have talked to East German
lawyers and the sort of information I got on the East German trials was depressing.
Professor Fletcher: I just wanted to respond to your point about the standard of proof
because that is a natural question for American lawyers to ask. Because there is no
separate jury, there are no jury instructions, so there is no explicit articulation of the
standard of proof. The general principle is that the prosecution has to establish guilt on
all issues and if there is any doubt, the defendant will receive the benefit of that doubt.
The only way to find out, however, whether there is doubt on the issue whether the
evidence is adequate or not, is to read the judgment written by the judge on the panel.
Now I take it in none of these cases has there been a record made. I mean a verbatim
record.
ProfessorFriedlander:No, it is against the law.

ProfessorFletcher: No, I don't think it is against the law.
Mr. Weinschenk: No, it is not against the law.
ProfessorFletcher:They don't do it as a matter of practice.
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ProfessorFriedlander:They are not allowed to use tape recorders.
ProfessorFletcher: If you're involved in a German trial I don't think there is anything
illegal about bringing in your own court reporter to take a verbatim record.
Mr. Weinschenk: That doesn't fit into the system. The testimony of a witness is dictated
into the record in summary. In the judgment you will find, "witness (A) is credible and
(B) he testified to facts x, y, and z." You will go down the line. I have seen judges who
make themselves big tables, incident (A), witness (X), evidences - a hoofmark, going
down the line very systematically.
ProfessorFletcher: I just wanted to say here that the point is that it is hard to go beyond
the judgment to find out whether the courts were acting responsibly, because they are
in fact interpreting all the material presented in thejudgment. So the judgment is indeed
the beginning and the end of the inquiry. It's different from the American system.
Professor Friedlander. I would like to add, first of all, the classical jury system of the
United States, which also operated in Weimar Germany, was reintroduced in Bavaria
for one year in the late 1940's. The trial records we have don't tell us anything because
all they provide are the answers of the juries. They didn't have to write detailed opinions.
In the non-classical jury system during much of this period, however, it was three judges
and six jurors. These six jurors chosen to sit in these trials are lay people who have the
right to vote on all issues, equal to the judges, except when it involves submission of
evidence or some other technical legal matter. They have equal votes on facts and
sentence and they could out-vote the judges in those years. Now I think they change the
numbers every once in a while. The judges have to write up the decision to conform to
that. Prosecutors have told me that if you're very sophisticated, you can tell when they
don't like what they are writing up. Of course, they have prestige and can influence the
jurors. But because there are no individually signed decisions, there are no dissents. You
never know who did what for what reason, unless you are personally involved in these
things. The decision can be appealed on both fact and law if anything in the decision
contradicts accepted fact, so the judges have to be very careful. I have read decisions in
U.S. federal courts on these denaturalization cases where judges, for example, get the
date of the invasion of Russia wrong. This cannot happen in Germany. The thing would
be sent back immediately because you can't make that kind of error. Consequently it
takes months for the reporting judge to write it up. This makes the decision a good
historical document in many ways.
Question: One point you made concerned the defense not going overseas or out of the
country to hear witnesses. Did the defense consider this a problem?
Mr. Weinschenk: The defendants don't go overseas. The defense counsel goes overseas.
Question: But even in that situation, normally according to our standards the defendant
should be present at his own trial.
Mr. Weinschenk: The reason why the defendants themselves don't go overseas is because
most countries wouldn't let them in. The defense counsel is there.
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ProfessorFriedlander:Whatever happens overseas must be read in open court.
Mr. Weinschenk: Yes. The protocols that are made abroad must be read in open court.
Question: Just a comment to Professor Friedlander that excusing some perpetrators of
war crimes or atrocities, reminds me ironically ofJewish law. I saw a great parallel when
you said that German laws excused some perpetrators of what otherwise would be crimes
because they didn't know what was happening or lacked formal education. I wondered
if it had ever occurred to you as well, that there was a strange parallel there.
ProfessorFriedlander:Certainly ironic.
ProfessorFletcher: Are there many cases in practice where the excuse is recognized?
ProfessorFriedlander:Putative duress?
ProfessorFletcher: Yes.
ProfessorFriedlander: Oh yes, for example, in the Sobibor case, and we are talking here
about persons who worked in an extermination camp where 250,000 people were murdered. Some of the very lowest of the functionaries on the bottom, who were limited in
their educational background, received the benefit of the putative duress defense. It
stretches the imagination a little bit when it concerns persons who are involved daily for
a year in this process of mass murder. But remember that in Sobibor the commander
of the whole camp was a man named Christian Wirth, who started in the euthanasia
program and later became the commander of all three extermination camps of Operation
Reinhard. He was a very violent person. It is possible that the persons under him thought
that something would happen to them if they didn't carry out his orders, and the courts
have thus accepted the putative duress defense. It happens a lot.
Professor Fletcher: The defendants were actually acquitted.
ProfessorFriedlander:I don't know. I'm not a lawyer, but acquitted is a good term. They
did not receive a sentence.
ProfessorFletcher: Well, wait a minute. What happened in these trials?
Professor Friedlander:They were guilty of murder but the court accepted their putative
duress defense.
Professor Fletcher: No, that doesn't make any sense. If the court established that there
was a wrongful act, they must have been acquitted of any criminal liability.
ProfessorFriedlander:Correct.
Professor Fletcher: O.K. So then in our sense they were acquitted. That's one of the
advantages of the German system. They can condemn the act but nonetheless excuse
the perpetrator at the same time.
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ProfessorFriedlander: The German Supreme Federal Court has strictly interpreted putative duress. They have laid down the rule that the perpetrator, in order to use the
defense successfully, must show that he did everything possible, even to the extent of
playing sick, having himself transferred or backing out. It hasn't always worked, but
there are such cases. One case of this involved a colonel in the uniformed police in
Russia, whose unit was assigned to killing Jews in a village. He protested the order. He
didn't want to carry it out, but yielded to his orders and his troops did kill about 500
persons. That night he got into a car and drove from Minsk to Rega over icy roads it's described in detail how icy they were - to report to his boss and to argue against
having to do this thing. Within twenty-four hours his entire unit was transferred out
and another unit was sent in to do the job. He was not convicted. In other words, duress
was accepted. His effort was enough, even though he had committed the act of shooting
the first batch. But he then protested and got out. He moved away, indicating, in other
words, that he made an effort. And I suppose that is really what the courts want.
Mr. Weinschenk: I have seen one case in which the defendant was not a military man, he
was a foreman in a slave labor factory.
ProfessorFriedlander:Oh, that case.
Mr. Weinschenk: Yes.
ProfessorFriedlander:One of the worst types.
Mr. Weinschenk: He wrote a confession. Confessions play an entirely different role in the
German system. He said, "Yes, I beat up people. I did this but I didn't discriminate, I
beat up everybody, not only Jews. After all, there was a war on." This case has been like
a yo-yo, up and down on appeals. It is still being tried.
ProfessorFriedlander:He got a life sentence and has sat in jail since the late 1940's. But
now the case has been reopened. What happens is that sometimes witnesses have testified
to some crime that they have observed and then later in a restitution case or something
else tell a different story. When that comes to light, then the case can be reopened.
ProfessorFletcher: I should add quickly that there is nothing peculiar about this German
defense of putative duress. The same principles apply in American law, except that it is
much more difficult to get duress recognized in a homicide case, whether real duress or
putative duress. Any other questions?
Question: Yes, Professor Friedlander, you mention difficulty in trying to convict informants and so forth. I know there is a case from the 1960's, a civil case, in which a woman
successfully sued in tort against someone who had informed on her husband during the
war. Do you know of any other tort cases against informants or perpetrators or persecutors where damages have been awarded as opposed to a sentence?
Professor Fletcher: Are you talking about the case that was discussed in the Hart/Fuller
debate? There is one famous case of this sort that is discussed in the 1958 Harvard Law
Review.
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Question: I think the case was after 1958.
Professor Fletcher: No, well there were some earlier cases that raised the same point
though they generally recognize the higher concept of law, and that the reliance upon
Nazi regulations was invalid and was not an adequate basis for defense.
Mr. Weinschenk: Is this a German case?

ProfessorFletcher: Yes, but I'm not so sure that tort damages were awarded. The case
focused on the problem of grudge informers.
Mr. Weinschenk: The German concept of tort is an entirely different one. It's a part of
the law of obligations. I know there have been cases of this nature, not only for informers
in Nazi camps, but also other damages in the Third Reich. One of the major suits was
against I.G. Farben, which resulted in a massive recovery.
ProfessorFriedlander:The case was filed by Norbert Wollheim, now an accountant in New
York City, who was a slave laborer in one of the I.G. Farben compounds. On behalf of
many thousands of slave laborers, he recovered several million deutschmarks, which
were distributed by a fiduciary organization.
ProfessorFletcher: The restitution provided by statute was not enough.
ProfessorFriedlander:Correct.

Professor Fletcher: The problem is that restitutionary statutes have precluded a large
number of torts. That is a good question. Why didn't the restitutionary statute provide
enough? Did they ask for punitive damages?
ProfessorFriedlander:Because it was negotiated wrong, that's why!
Mr. Weinschenk: The Wollheim suit was based on general principles of noncommitted act
tort law.
ProfessorFletcher: But it was not precluded by the recovery that was already available.
Mr. Weinschenk: No because the indemnification statutes did not cover the precise situation that they would handle.
Professor Fletcher: I do not know. Do the restitutionary statutes provide for pain and
suffering?
Mr. Weinschenk: Not in that sense, no.

